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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case  
 Jody A. Miller appeals from the district court’s order granting the state’s motion to 
summarily dismiss all the claims in his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the facts underlying Miller’s 
conviction for second degree murder are as follows: 
Near 3:30 am the morning of April 17, 2011, defendant JODY ALLEN 
MILLER (male/then age 40 now 41/primary assailant), codefendant IRAEL 
KENNEDY (male/age 21/secondary aggressor), codefendant STEPHEN 
MILTON (male/age 21/codefendant Kennedy’s “best friend”/bystander), 
and codefendant KELLY MILLER (female/age 40/ex-wife of defendant 
Jody Miller/mother of defendant Kennedy/operator of vehicle transporting 
all codefendants to/from the murder scene), travelled from Spokane to the 
Plummer (ID) apartment of “Anastasia Morrison” (‘Ana’/witness/age 
29/former girlfriend of codefendant Kennedy). 
 . . . . 
After arriving in Plummer, witness Morrison (former girlfriend of 
codefendant Kennedy) reported knocks at her apartment door answered 
by her husband. She reported intoxicated and boisterous codefendant 
Kennedy barged into her home when greeted, attempted to kiss her, and 
spoke briefly concerning the welfare of her sleeping child. Morrison 
reported defendant Jody Miller wanted contact with his former girlfriend 
(her mother/witness Ashby) whose residence shared with victim Swiney 
was nearby. Morrison, wanting the male codefendants NOT at her 
residence, escorted them to the Swiney/Ashby residence. Witness Ashby 
reported she and victim Swiney were awakened by knocks at their door. 
Victim Swiney answered and so began an argumentative verbal exchange 
(concerning entry) between victim Swiney and defendant Jody Miller. 
Victim Swiney denied defendant Jody Miller entry to see witness Ashby 
(victim Swiney’s girlfriend and a former girlfriend of defendant). As Swiney 
attempted to shut the door, witness Morrison (standing nearby) reported 
codefendant Kennedy turned to his male codefendants and said, “Watch 
this” and charged the door with Kennedy and codefendant Miller forcibly 
entering the victim’s residence (barging through the door). Morrison 
reported seeing codefendant Kennedy and defendant Jody Miller striking 
victim Swiney using their hands -- codefendant Kennedy making motions 
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at the victim’s head and defendant Jody Miller making ‘hooking’ motions 
with his arms striking the victim. The assault duration was estimated at 
approximately one minute. Morrison and other witnesses reported 
defendant Miller and codefendant Kennedy bloodied (by the victim’s 
blood). A juvenile witness (Ashby’s grandson/age 13) present inside the 
victim’s residence, reported seeing a knife in defendant Jody Miller’s hand 
as he came through the door and using it as he stabbed the victim. 
Codefendant Kennedy the witness did not see holding or using a knife -- 
the witness reported seeing him throwing punches at the victim’s 
midsection. Witness Ashby’s remarks generally corroborated those of her 
grandson/juvenile witness as did witness Morrison’s (her daughter). 
Witness statements also indicated defendant Jodi Miller and codefendant 
Kennedy pushed away at least two witnesses who attempted to “pull them 
off” the victim. Codefendant Milton had followed defendant Miller and 
codefendant Kennedy into the victim’s residence, his participation in the 
assault not emphasized by witnesses nor factually noted in detail by 
investigators. (Given his ‘accessory’ charge, it appears Milton was not an 
active participant in the assault). Immediately after the assault male 
codefendants exited the premise. Witness Ashby determined victim 
Swiney beaten and stabbed and called police (he died on-scene from 
trauma inflicted). [Investigation established defendant Jody Miller as 
primary assailant -- also corroborated in part by his own statements made 
to witnesses and codefendants.] Male codefendants Milton, Kennedy, and 
Jody Miller (in that apparent order) fled the murder scene to the nearby 
waiting car occupied (not exited) and driven by codefendant Kelly Miller. 
All four codefendants travelled back to the Spokane residence of 
codefendants Kelly Miller and Irael Kennedy (her son). Dialogue 
concerning their actions/roles in the offense occurred as they travelled 
back to Spokane. During that travel codefendants were informed by 
phone/text that victim Swiney had deceased. Codefendants Kennedy, 
Milton, and Kelly Miller then concluded from defendant Jody Miller’s 
remarks/responses to questions, that his (knife) assault had killed victim 
Swiney. Once in Spokane, defendant Jody Miller separated from his three 
codefendants. His three codefendants subsequently travelled to and were 
arrested at Spokane’s Holy Family Hospital. Codefendant Kennedy was 
transported there by his mother/codefendant Kelly Miller for treatment to 
stop bleeding from a sharp-object laceration to his hand requiring stitches.  
(Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 8 (PSI), pp.2-4 (verbatim).) 
 About 15 hours after Swiney was murdered, Detective Kirk Keyser of the 
Spokane County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Miller after he waived his constitutional 
rights.  (Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pp.17-18.)  Miller stated that he 
thought he used the knife during the incident to protect himself, but did not know where 
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he stabbed Swiney.  (Id., p.20.)  Miller told Detective Keyser that when he learned 
during the return drive to Spokane that Swiney had died, he “apologized to everyone in 
the car and he told them he was sorry that he got them in trouble and that the subject 
was dead.”  (Id., p.21.)  Miller also said that “he was not usually a violent person.  This 
was out of the ordinary for him.”  (Id.)  Later that evening, Miller asked to speak with 
Detective Keyser again, and told him, “I take full responsibility, but [Angelita] could have 
stopped this.”  (Id.) 
 As set forth in the district court’s Order Granting Motion for Summary Dismissal, 
Miller’s underlying criminal case proceeded as follows: 
 Petitioner was charged with first degree murder.  Benewah County 
public defender, Will Butler, was appointed to represent him.  Jonathan 
Hull was subsequently appointed as co-counsel.  On January 26, 2012, 
shortly before trial was to commence, Petitioner and the state entered a 
plea agreement for an Alford [sic] plea to second degree murder.  
Pursuant to that agreement if Petitioner was sentenced to no more than a 
unified sentence of 25 years with 12 ½ years fixed Petitioner waived his 
right to appeal.  Petitioner received a 25 year sentence with 12 ½ years 
fixed. 
 
 At the change of plea hearing petitioner confirmed the details of the 
plea agreement, confirmed that he knew the consequences of an Alford 
plea and that he was giving up his right to appeal if the court followed the 
agreement.  Petitioner was given his rights and acknowledged that he was 
waiving his right to challenge any search and seizure and his right to 
challenge any statements he made to police.  He acknowledged that he 
understood the charges.  He agreed his plea was voluntary. 
 
 The issue of post-conviction relief was discussed at the hearing.  
Petitioner said he wanted to discuss the case with the prosecutor.  When 
asked if he was willing to give up his right to post-conviction relief 
petitioner stated: “Yeah.  If we can – if we can get to that, yeah.  I don’t 
have a problem with that at all.”  The prosecutor stated that he was willing 
to talk to petitioner, but he wanted to be sure that the case would not be 
litigated sometime in the future.  Petitioner stated he was comfortable with 
that.       
 
(R., pp.113-114.) 
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 Miller timely filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief (R., pp.3-27) and a 
supporting memorandum (R., pp.28-68), presenting the following claims: 
1. Failed to convey plea offers; 
 
2. Failed to make timely suppresion [sic] motions to: 
 
(a) Petitioner [sic] pre-arraignment confession violate [sic] Fifth 
Amendment 
 
(b) (minor), statements violate the 
Confrontation Clause 
 
(c)  Knife handle was contaminated and its usage violate [sic] 
due process 
 
3. Failed to adequately explain waiver to speedy trial right 
 
4. Mr. Butler failed to keep Petitioner apprised of his pretrial 
preparation  
 
5. Inadequate investigation by counsel prejudiced Defendant 
 
6. Mr. Butler’s errors and omissions prejudiced Petitioner [sic] 
defense, and right to a jury trial 
 
7. Mr. Butler failed to argue with applicable law Petitioner taped 
recorded telephone conversations not be admitted at trial 
 
8. Mr. Butler deprived Petitioner [of] his defense and right to a trial, 
causing the Aflord [sic] plea 
 
9. Prosecutorial misconduct 
 
(R., p.24 (capitalization modified, references to page numbers omitted).) 
 After the state filed an Answer (R., pp.81-84),  Miller was appointed counsel to 
represent him in his post-conviction proceeding (R., pp.85-86).  The state filed a motion 
for summary dismissal (R., pp.100-112), which was granted without a hearing 
(R., pp.113-121).  The district court entered a Judgment dismissing Miller’s post-
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conviction claims with prejudice.  (R., pp.122-123.)  Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.124-138.) 
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ISSUES 
 Miller states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the Defendant waive his right to his post-conviction rights as 
part of his plea agreement. 
  
B. Was the Defendants [sic] trial counsel ineffective during the 
adversarial testing process. 
 
C. Does the Defendant have the right to be competent during 
questioning by law enforcement. 
 
 (Appellant’s Brief, p.6 (capitalization modified).)   
 The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Miller failed to establish error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief?     
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ARGUMENT 
Miller Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Of His 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
 On appeal, Miller argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
(1) seek suppression of Miller’s confession based on involuntariness due to intoxication, 
(2) conduct a thorough investigation by not obtaining DNA and blood spatter evidence 
to show through expert testimony that Irael Kennedy – not Miller – fatally stabbed 
Antowyn Swiney, and (3) inform Miller of specific trial strategies.1  (See generally 
Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-12.)  Miller further argues he was deprived of effective assistance 
of counsel by the cumulative effects of counsel’s errors.  (Id., p.8.)   Miller’s arguments 
fail.     
  
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
                                                          
1  Inasmuch as the district court’s summary dismissal on the petition was warranted, the 
state opts to not address Miller’s argument that the court erred by finding, as part of his 
plea agreement, that he waived his right to file a post-conviction petition.  (See 
Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-22); see also Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“We therefore hold that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an IAC 
claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.”). 
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 Error is never presumed on appeal.  The appellant must affirmatively 
demonstrate error on the record; the appellate court will not review the record in search 
of it.  Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764, 620 P.2d 798 (1980); State v. Knight, 128 Idaho 
862, 865, 920 P.2d 78, 81 (Ct. App. 1996).  Pro se litigants are held to the same 
standards and rules of appellate procedure as are parties appealing through counsel.  
State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 P.2d 1333 (1977); see also Faretta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) (“[t]he right of self-representation is not ... a license not 
to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”). 
 
C. Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
Involving Guilty Pleas 
 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner “must establish that his counsel 
was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice to the 
claimant.”  Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)).  “There is a strong 
presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of professional 
assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. (citing State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989)).  In addition, it is well-established that “[a] fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight . . . and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 
1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original)). 
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 To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must “show a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would be different but for counsel’s deficient performance.”  
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing State v. Row, 
131 Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998)).  “‘A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”  Id. (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694).  When the alleged deficiency involves counsel’s advice in relation to a 
guilty plea, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted).2  The focus of a determination of whether a 
defendant would not have pleaded guilty is the defendant’s state of mind at the time the 
guilty plea was entered.  McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852, 103 P.3d 460, 465 
(2004) (“In other words, the likelihood that without counsel’s errors a defendant may or 
may not have been able to prevail at trial is relevant only to the extent it sheds light on 
the defendant’s state of mind when he pleaded guilty.”); see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  
                                                          
2  In Hill, the Supreme Court hypothesized that, where an attorney has failed to discover 
or investigate potentially exculpatory evidence, the assessment of whether a defendant 
would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty “will depend in large part on a 
prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.”  474 
U.S. at 59.  As explained in McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852, 103 P.3d 460, 465 
(2004), in contrast to the scenario described in Hill: 
 
[H]ere the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel involves issues surrounding 
the reservations of rights agreement, and has nothing to do with issues 
that would be raised at trial.  Therefore, here we simply apply the test 
articulated in Hill requiring a defendant “show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. 
 
140 Idaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465. 
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“Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that 
a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”  
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
470 (2000)).   
 
D. The Court Should Decline To Consider All But One Of Miller’s Arguments 
Because They Are Not Supported With Argument And Authority         
 
 Apart from claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to 
suppress his confession and that he did not waive his right to file a petition for post-
conviction relief (see n.1, supra), Miller argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to (1) obtain DNA and blood spatter evidence and expert testimony to show that 
Irael Kennedy was the person who fatally stabbed Mr. Swiney, the victim, (2) inform him 
of specific trial strategies, and (3) conduct a thorough investigation of his claims.  (See 
generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-12.)  Miller also argues that he was deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel by the cumulative effects of counsel’s errors.  (Id., p.8.)   
Because none of Miller’s arguments are supported by argument and authority in his 
Appellant’s Brief, they are waived and must be denied.   
 In addressing his “DNA/blood spatter” claim, Miller states: 
Appellant was also attempting to secure evidence which would have 
shown that, because of the blood splatter [sic], DNA testing would have 
shown that blood found on Irael Kennedy was consistent with the 
coloration of blood which came from arteries.  The blood splatter [sic] 
testing would have shown that Irael Kennedy was the individual, [sic] 
whom had possession of the knife. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  Miller does not provide any other argument or authority to 
support his conclusory claim that DNA and blood spatter evidence would have shown 
Irael Kennedy, and not Miller, stabbed Swiney.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-
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12.)  Similarly, Miller alleges in both conclusory and speculative manner that his trial 
counsel “failed to inform him of specific trial strategies and failed to do a thorough 
investigation into the claims,” and did not call any expert witnesses at trial to refute the 
evidence (Appellant’s Brief, p.9), but he does not specifically reveal what his trial 
counsel failed to do, how it prejudiced his case, or how the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing those claims for failing to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
(see R., p.116).     
  In short, Miller presents no identifiable appellate issues to challenge the district 
court’s summary dismissal order; he merely reasserts the allegations of several claims 
presented in his post-conviction relief petition.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-
12.)  Because Miller has failed to present argument, authority, or both, in regard to the 
propriety of the district court’s summary dismissal of his three claims, the contentions 
raised in his Appellant’s Brief should not be considered on appeal.  In State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered.  Earlier formulations of 
this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was not supported with 
argument and authority.  A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking.  Zichko 
supported this assignment of error with argument but no authority.  
Consequently, he waived this issue on appeal. 
 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted).  
 Inasmuch as Miller has failed to present this Court with argument and authority to 
challenge the district court’s summary dismissal of the three above-described claims, 
pursuant to Zichko, this Court should not consider the contentions in his Appellant’s 
Brief relating to those claims.   
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E. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of All Of Miller’s Claims, He Has Failed 
To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His Petition 
 
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative.  “To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each 
element of petitioner’s claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.   
 While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court 
is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 
522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)).  If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial 
court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition.  
Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  
“Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
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1. The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Miller’s Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Seek To Suppress His Confession  
 
 Miller contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of 
his confession to Detective Keyser.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-12.)  Miller asserts he was 
intoxicated during his interview, rendering his confession involuntary, and that he would 
not have pled guilty if he had known it was inadmissible at trial.  (Id.)  In his 
Memorandum of Facts and Law in Support of Post Conviction [sic] Relief, which set 
forth Miller’s post-conviction claims (see R., p.24 (indexing claims presented in 
supporting memorandum)), he stated: 
 Petitioner contends Mr. Butler has a fiduciary duty to challenge 
Petitioner’s confession during pretrial preparation, on the grounds that: 
(1) The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  
(2) Petitioner under the influence of drugs to the extent that his judgment 
was impaired.  . . .  
 
 . . . .  
 
 Mr. Butler made it clear he had discovery materials and Detective 
Kirk Keyser [sic] (hereinafter refer “Detective Keyser”), Report #: 11-
00112886, interviewed and supporting facts, which were given on April 26, 
2011, to Detective Kirk [sic], to wit: page 17, “At 1915 hours, I advised him 
of his constitutional rights which he stated he understood and agreed to 
waive.  See attached rights cards in case file”.; page 18, paragraph 2, line 
16, “he was drunk”; page 19, line 9, “he told me that he was pretty drunk.”  
(Exhibit “4”)   
 
 Does Detective Keyser’s report address petitioner’s voluntary 
decision to speak was made with full awareness and comprehension 
under the Miranda requirement by the police to convey, the waivers were 
valid?  
 
(R., pp.33-34 (punctuation and underscore verbatim; italics added).)   
 Miller’s rendition of Detective Keyser’s interview with him is misleading in that it 
could be read to mean that the statements “he was drunk” and “he told me that he was 
pretty drunk” pertain to Miller’s state of sobriety when he gave his confession.  However, 
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Detective Keyser’s police report shows that the statements about Miller being drunk 
described his state of intoxication when the murder occurred – not when he confessed 
to Detective Keyser 15 hours later.  (See Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 4, 
pp.17-19.)   
 Apart from Miller’s self-serving and conclusory allegation that he was intoxicated 
when he confessed to stabbing Swiney, see Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 
802, the only support he cites for his claim (see R., pp.33-35) -- Detective Keyser’s 
report -- merely repeats what Miller told him about being drunk at the time of the 
offense, and is therefore irrelevant (Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 4, pp.17-
19).  Recognizing that Miller failed to present any credible evidence showing his 
confession was involuntary due to intoxication, the district court correctly held, 
“Petitioner has not set forth any material facts to show that any such motions would 
have been successful.” (R., p.120.) 
 The district court further correctly explained, “Petitioner also waived his right to 
assert any such motions when his plea was taken.”  (R., p.120; see Pet’s. Exhibits to 
Memorandum, Exhibit 7, 1/26/12 Tr., p.143, L.1 – p.145, L.13.)  Therefore, regardless of 
the merits of Miller’s claim that his confession was involuntary due to intoxication, his 
trial counsel was precluded by the plea agreement from filing a motion to suppress the 
confession.  Miller has failed to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient under Strickland for abiding by that agreement.     
  
  15 
 
2. The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Miller’s Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Obtain DNA And Blood Spatter 
Evidence To Show Irael Kennedy Stabbed The Victim  
 
 Miller argues that his district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that 
his trial counsel conducted an inadequate investigation by failing to obtain DNA and 
blood spatter evidence from Irael Kennedy’s shirt to show that Kennedy stabbed 
Antowyn Swiney.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.)  Miller’s argument is based on written 
complaints he presented to the trial court during a pre-trial motion to replace his trial 
counsel.  (See id.; R., pp.45-50, 53-54; Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 7, 
1/24/12 Tr., p.77, L.8 – p.98, L.10.) 
 In Miller’s post-conviction petition, he asserted: 
 Petitioner assert [sic] the forensic evidence substantiate [sic] the 
truth to be an absolution [sic] defense.  The forensic science is utilized in 
prosecution of murder cases by prosecutors.  A few forensic sciences are: 
mitochondrial DNA analysis, crime scene investigation, blood pattern 
analysis, crime reconstruction specialists, and laboratory methods or 
technologists, and are used for problem solving and discovery. 
 
 . . . .  
 
 Petitioner assert [sic] the forensic data would have bolster [sic] my 
theory I did not stab SWINEY with the knife, . . . . 
 
(R., pp.49-50.) 
Miller has failed to show any error in the district court’s summary dismissal of this 
claim.  In regard to trial counsel’s alleged failure to obtain DNA evidence from 
Kennedy’s shirt, the prosecutor explained at the motion hearing: 
[Defense counsel] did contact me about that at the time, about having 
those things tested.  . . .  And so the idea at the time was proving that Irael 
Kennedy’s DNA was on the victim, the victim’s DNA was on Mr. Kennedy.  
This is hand-to-hand combat.  There’s blood all over the place from both 
of them.  Mr. Kennedy was stabbed in the hand.  Mr. Swiney is stabbed all 
over the place.  Their blood is intermixed.  And so I said – I pointed out to 
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defense counsel that I would simply stipulate to those facts, that the DNA 
need not be tested because I would stipulate to the fact each of their DNA 
is going to be on the other.  And so at that time I understood that’s how it 
was going to be addressed, is by stipulation. 
 
 I don’t think – the reason I point that out is, a test has to be directed 
towards some specific – you’ve got to test for something.  You don’t just 
test on a fishing trip to see what you find.  And so I would stipulate to 
those facts, that DNA was present where the defense suspects it might 
be. 
 
(Pet’s. Exhibits to Memorandum, Exhibit 7, 1/24/12 Tr., p.91, L.22 – p.92, L.19; see id., 
p.48, L.21 - p.49, L.3.)  Later in the motion hearing, Miller acknowledged the state’s 
stipulation on DNA.  (Id., p.94, Ls.12-15.)  Based on the prosecutor’s stipulation, Miller’s 
claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain DNA evidence from Kennedy’s 
shirt is meritless.  In short, it could not have been deficient performance, much less 
prejudicial, for Miller’s trial counsel to not pursue DNA evidence to prove what was 
already stipulated to.   
 In addition to DNA evidence, Miller insisted at the motion hearing that blood 
spatter evidence was needed to show that he did not stab Swiney.  (Id., p.94, L.19 – 
p.95, L.20.)  Miller’s trial counsel (Mr. Butler) explained at that hearing that he had 
discussed blood spatter evidence “at length” with Mr. Hull (co-counsel) and Mr. Durant 
(an investigator) and “we decided along with Mr. Miller to go a different direction[,]” but 
Miller apparently wanted to bring the subject up again.  (Id., p.96, Ls.9-15.)   
In his post-conviction petition, Miller stated that blood spatter evidence is one of 
the forensic sciences that is “used for problem solving and discovery” and “would have 
bolster [sic] [his] theory [he] did not stab Swiney with the knife[.]”  (R., p.49 
(capitalization modified).)  Nowhere in Miller’s post-conviction petition or supporting 
memorandum did he present any credible evidence that blood spatter evidence would 
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likely have shown that he did not stab Swiney, or that Kennedy did.  Miller’s claim is 
based on pure speculation and conjecture. See Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d 
at 802.  Further, Miller did not even allege that, if blood spatter analysis of Kennedy’s 
shirt had been pursued by his trial counsel, he would not have pled guilty.  (See 
R., pp.45-58); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  Miller failed to present a genuine 
issue of material fact demonstrating that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient, 
much less prejudicial, under Strickland and Hill.   
The district court correctly concluded, Miller “fails to present material facts as to 
what additional investigation should have been done and has failed to show that such 
investigations would have impacted the outcome of the case.”  (R., p.120 (emphasis 
added).)   
 
3. The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Miller’s Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Inform Him Of Specific Trial 
Strategies 
 
 Miller argues on appeal, as he did below, that his “trial counsel failed to inform 
him of specific trial strategies[.]”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9; see R., pp.42-45.)  By making 
that claim, and because he pled guilty, Miller was required to identify the trial strategies 
he was not made aware of and demonstrate prejudice by showing that, had he been so 
informed, he would not have pled guilty.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.  
 Not only did Miller fail to identify what trial strategies his trial counsel failed to 
inform him of, he failed to even allege prejudice as per Hill.  (See R., pp.42-45.)  
Therefore, in regard to both the deficient performance and prejudice “ineffective 
assistance” prongs of Strickland and Hill, the district court properly summarily dismissed 
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Miller’s claim because he failed to present a genuine issue of material fact which would 
entitle him to post-conviction relief.  (R., pp.119-123.)      
 
 4. Miller Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
 Miller “asserts that the cumulative effects of counsel’s errors deprived [him] of 
‘effective assistance of counsel’ as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Miller’s argument lacks merit. 
 Under Idaho’s doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of 
the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 
131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct. App. 1998).  Thus, if a petitioner fails to prove 
more than one incident of deficient performance then there is no prejudice to cumulate.  
See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011).  The ultimate question of 
Strickland prejudice is whether the defendant was denied “a fair trial, a trial whose result 
is reliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 Miller has failed to show his counsel committed two acts of deficient 
performance, and therefore has failed to show any errors to cumulate.  Even if there 
had been multiple acts of deficient performance, Miller has failed to show that they 
would be cumulatively prejudicial.  For these reasons, Miller has failed to show 
cumulative error.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing Miller’s post-conviction petition. 
 DATED this 23rd day of February, 2017. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ John C. McKinney_______ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of February, 2017, caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
 
JODY A. MILLER 
INMATE #103160 
I.S.C.C. UNIT F 
P. O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID  83707 
 
 
 
      __/s/ John C. McKinney______ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
 
 
 
